Max Hastings, it is true, has written numerous first-rate books on the Second World War. But unlike many other historians working in the field he is a born contrarian, a position no doubt nurtured by his career as a journalist and newspaper editor. Hastings's books epitomize good popular history: well-researched, well-written, and accessible. But his opinions should be balanced against those of other, more objective historians.

And if you're referring to All Hell Let Loose surely you'll know that the German Government and Hitler were from the mid 1930s synonymous. The opinion to which you refer was held by a number of industrialists — ardent Nazis, it is true, but also passionate and committed capitalists. Their view was informed by conflicting ideas — on one hand the profitability of running a wartime economy; on the other fear for what might occur should the regime tumble — and cannot be taken at face value. Moreover, industrialists are not military men. They understand production and supply, the complex realm of economics, but they were denied and probably incapable of processing sophisticated strategic ideas.

So too must Halder's diary be questioned. Hitler questioned Halder's loyalty in the wake of the 20 July plot — the latter was fortunate to escape with his life — and frequently argued with the head of OKH. Furthermore, he conspired with Brauchitsch in 1939, evidence of his skepticism well before the diary entry referenced in Hastings's book.

I simply cannot overstate how much I enjoy reading Max Hastings. I take perverse pleasure in his acerbic commentary and, particularly, his virulent dislike for Montgomery. He is a first-rate historian but, like anyone working in the field, should never be in isolation. I realize, of course, that I've ignored the major question: is Hastings correct in speculating that "[w]hatever the prowess of the Wehrmacht, the nation lacked means to win; it could aspire only to force its enemies to parley, together or severally." I think this statement, along with the admittedly vague estimate of capital needed to win the war, became true when the Luftwaffe collapsed and when the strategic bombing offensive began to emerge as a serious threat to German industry.

TL;DR Max Hastings is often right, except when he's not